Abstract
Dominica and Vanuatu characterise the common vulnerabilities that small states face, as well as the diversity that is also typical among small states, making them a good case study for a comparative analysis of their experiences with disaster risk reduction and management, particularly in the cases of Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika. The paper finds that, despite both countries historically experiencing frequent and severe episodes of natural disasters, Vanuatu has made more effort to ensure that disaster risk reduction, not just disaster management, is firmly entrenched in its normative frameworks. Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika tested both governments' disaster response systems. Both countries reacted in similar ways and had similar challenges, although Vanuatu appeared to be more committed to learning from its experiences. Vanuatu also had a better pre-disaster position than Dominica, as it had significantly lower debt levels and had a wider range of disasterfinancing instruments at its disposal. These better pre-existing conditions meant that Vanuatu was better able to raise finances to meet the total costs of Cyclone Pam. On the other hand, Dominica's pre-existing conditions limited its options and fell far short of meeting the total costs of Hurricane Erika, even though those costs have probably been underestimated. Moreover, to Vanuatu's advantage, bilateral and multilateral donors were more responsive to relief and reconstruction efforts than for Dominica, where the government found it more difficult to secure donor grant funding. Nevertheless, both countries' economies have since rebounded from the impact of the disasters, albeit only to face another spate of disasters in the form of Hurricane Maria, which devastated Dominica, and a volcanic eruption on Vanuatu's Ambae Island in 2017. The main lessons from this comparative analysis reinforces the importance of (i) strong macroeconomic foundations, (ii) mainstreaming and implementation of disaster risk reduction and management strategies and (iii) having in place ex-ante financing arrangements.
Introduction
As the impact of climate change increases the frequency and severity of natural disasters, small states are disproportionately affected by these extreme climatic events. In March 2015, Category 5 Cyclone Pam devastated the Pacific island country of Vanuatu, causing widespread damage and loss of life. Later the same year, in the Caribbean, Hurricane Erika left a trail of destruction on the tiny island of Dominica. Two different regions, two different islands, but with similar vulnerability and resilience profiles and a shared history of the impact of disasters. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the experiences of Vanuatu and Dominica with disaster risk reduction and management, particularly in the cases of Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika.
There are important lessons to learn from their past experiences, as both countries continue to face major natural disasters even before fully recovering from the previous disaster. In September 2017, Dominica was battered once more, this time by Category 5 Hurricane Maria (CNN 2017) , and within a week, across in the Pacific region, Vanuatu had to evacuate 11,000 people (5% of its population) from the threat of volcanic eruption on the island of Ambae (Bevege 2017) . Many small states find themselves in similar situations of facing disasters without fully recovering from the previous ones and will, therefore, have a continuous challenge in disaster risk reduction and management.
Disaster risk reduction strategies are concerned with anticipating and reducing the risk related to disasters, while disaster risk management can be thought of as the implementation of disaster risk reduction (UNISDR 2015a) . In other words, disaster risk reduction is about understanding risk, mitigating that risk or finding alternatives where mitigation is not feasible, whereas disaster risk management is preparedness for the risk that cannot be mitigated. Historically, the focus was on preparedness and the emergency response to disasters, but it is now widely recognised that it is only by reducing and managing the underlying drivers of risk that the impact of disasters can be reduced (UNISDR 2015a). These underlying drivers of risk are related to a country's socio-economic and governance foundations.
This paper first provides an overview of Dominica's and Vanuatu's national contexts related to the underlying risk factors, including an examination of the countries' vulnerability and resilience to shocks (Section 2). This is followed by a survey of the countries' disaster risk reduction and management frameworks, covering legal, normative and institutional frameworks (Section 3). Section 4 analyses the countries' public financial management of disasters, while Section 5 focuses on the emergency and disaster management experiences with Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika. Section 6 summarises the common challenges and lessons learnt, which are useful not just for Dominica and Vanuatu but for other small states as well.
National Context

Overview
Countries in the Caribbean and Pacific region are highly exposed to a range of natural hazards of hydrometeorological origin (such as cyclones, droughts, landslides and floods) and geological origin (including volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis) (SPC et al. 2016; CDEMA and CDB 2003) . These natural hazards result in social and economic disruption, which affect thousands of people and exacerbate existing development challenges in both regions. 
Socio-economic context
Vanuatu's economy is based primarily on smallscale agriculture, which provides a living for about two thirds of the population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). Fishing, offshore financial services and tourism are the other mainstays of the economy. A small light industry sector caters to the local market. The Dominican economy has also been dependent on agriculture, mainly bananas (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). However, in recent years, the economy has increasingly been driven by tourism. Dominica has also successfully developed an offshore medical education sector and is attempting to foster an offshore financial industry, and it also has plans to explore geothermal energy resources. 2 In addition, Dominica has benefited from an Economic Citizenship Programme, which attracts foreign investment in exchange for citizenship. the global financial crisis was particularly severe for Dominica, whereas Vanuatu's economy was relatively sheltered (Figure 1 ). While both countries' tourism sectors were adversely affected, Vanuatu's economy was buttressed by its commodity exports and agricultural production (IMF 2013a (IMF , 2015a . Vanuatu also managed a strong recovery from 2011 onwards, up until 2015, when Cyclone Pam hit. This pre-cyclone growth was led by agricultural production and exports as global commodity prices increased, and by a few large public infrastructure projects, such as the submarine cable connection, which was completed in 2014 (IMF 2015a). On the other hand, Dominica's recovery from the global financial crisis was fragile owing to anaemic domestic demand and closure of some manufacturing operations (IMF 2013a). As expected, both countries' economic growth fell in the aftermaths of Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika, although the impact on Dominica has been more pronounced (Figure 1 ). In addition, while both countries have since recovered from the impact of the disasters, Vanuatu has rebounded more strongly (Figure 1 ; see also Section 5.4). Although the ni-Vanuatu might not be well off in terms of income, their strong family and community ties have traditionally provided social safety nets for the most disadvantaged and vulnerable (Vanuatu NSO et al. 2006) , which has been critical in times of natural disasters. Vanuatu was also ranked fourth of 140 countries by the 2016 Happy Planet Index Score, which measures how well nations are doing with achieving long, happy, sustainable lives (Dominica was not ranked) (Jeffrey et al. 2016 ).
Vanuatu's unemployment rate is also lower, at 4.6 per cent (Vanuatu NSO 2009a) (CLGF 2015) . While local government in Dominica is largely responsible for road maintenance, local government in Vanuatu is responsible for various services ranging from education to regional planning (CLGF 2015) .
The non-governmental organisation (NGO) community in Dominica, while comparatively small, is involved in fundraising and volunteerism in gender, health, environmental and community projects (United States Department of State 2017). The government occasionally partners with NGOs on various activities. Vanuatu, on the other hand, has a long-standing history of civil society organisations (CSOs) operating in a range of sectors, including governance, disaster risk reduction, health and disability services (ADB 2017a). Outside the urban centres, the state reach is very weak, and power is vested in the churches and the kastom chiefly system (ADB 2017a). Although the Vanuatu Government has prioritised CSO engagement since 2002, civil society participation in policy-making has been limited and opportunities underutilised as civil society have traditionally focused on service delivery rather than on being a watchdog (ADB 2017a).
Vulnerability and resilience
Vanuatu topped the list of 171 countries most at risk of natural disasters according to the 2016 World Risk Index, for the fourth year in a row (Dominica was not assessed). 7 The island nation experiences cyclones, storm surges, landslides, flooding and droughts (Vanuatu Government 2015a) (Table 2) . Vanuatu is also located on the Pacific Ring of Fire and is highly exposed to geophysical threats, such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. Similarly, like most of its Caribbean neighbours, Dominica is vulnerable to multiple hazards, some of which can occur simultaneously (Dominica ODM 2014) (Table 2 ). Among the most common are hurricanes, earthquakes, flooding, volcanic activity, and associated tsunami threats. The amount of damage to property, crops and livestock in the year of the event.
b Sum of injured (those suffering from physical injuries, trauma or an illness requiring immediate medical assistance as a direct result of a disaster), homeless (number of people whose houses were destroyed or heavily damaged and who therefore needed shelter after an event) and affected people (those requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency).
c Number of people who lost their lives because the event happened. Source: EM-DAT: The Emergency Events Database -Université catholique de Louvain (UCL) -CRED, D. Guha-Sapir -www.emdat.
be, Brussels, Belgium (accessed 25 September 2017).
Both countries have a long history of suffering significant damage, loss of life, injuries and homelessness from various disasters ( (Figure 2 ).
While vulnerability to disasters is an important indicator in assessing a country's disaster risk profile, its resilience and ability to cope are equally important factors. According to Briguglio's (2014) revised vulnerability/resilience framework, Dominica and Vanuatu are both categorised as 'high vulnerable and high resilience' countries. This means that while they are both highly vulnerable to shocks, including natural disasters, they also have policies and structures in place to minimise or withstand the adverse effects from such shocks. 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Strategies
Policy framework
Dominica developed a National Disaster Plan in 1986, which was subsequently revised in 2001 and again in 2009 (Dominica ODM 2014) . The plan details arrangements to manage the effects of disasters, assigns responsibilities and outlines coordination of emergency activities during major disasters, and encourages a process of learning to cope adequately with the recovery (Dominica NEPO 2011) . While consultations have been held on the revised draft, it was still not formally endorsed at the time this paper was finalised (Dominica ODM 2017) . Disaster risk reduction elements are also not comprehensively covered in the National Disaster Plan. However, some aspects of disaster risk reduction are captured in Dominica's Low-Carbon Climate-Resilient Development Strategy 2012-2020 (Dominica Government 2012) .
In contrast, disaster risk reduction has been increasingly referenced in Vanuatu's normative frameworks, including its overarching national development plan (Vanuatu 2030 Vanuatu also has in place a National Cyclone Support Plan 2016-17, which provide guidelines for all agencies on a coordinated approach during a cyclone response (Vanuatu MCCA 2016) . This plan was initiated following the lessons learnt from Cyclone Pam. In addition, a Provincial Disaster and Climate Response Plan 2016 is in place to guide provincial councils to enhance coordination between the national, provincial, area council and community levels in terms of prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery from disasters in each province (Vanuatu NDMO 2016 Dominica's NEPO and ODM work closely with the CDEMA in responding to disasters. The CDEMA is a regional intergovernmental agency for disaster management in the Caribbean Community, with responsibility for the mobilisation and coordination of emergency response and relief efforts to its participating states (CDEMA 2017b). In Vanuatu's case, the NDC and NDMO work closely with the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT), 10 which is a network of NGOs committed to effective humanitarian coordination, disaster preparedness and humanitarian response. In 2011, the NDMO, the VHT and the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) adopted a cluster coordination mechanism to strengthen the effectiveness and coordination of humanitarian assistance during times of emergency (Vanuatu Government 2015c) 
Public Financial Management of Disasters
A country's debt situation is important in understanding its sovereign risk, which in the context of disasters is the risk that a government could default on its debt or other obligations as a result of a disaster (UNISDR 2015b). For Vanuatu, public debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has been relatively low at around 22 per cent over the last 10 years ( Figure 4 ). This is in line with successive governments' cautious approach to debt financing (IMF 2013b (IMF , 2015a (IMF , 2016b , undertaking strict public expenditure restraint amid constant revenues (PCRAFI 2015) . Government revenues are low by regional standards and Vanuatu does not have a personal or corporate income tax (IMF 2016b).
In contrast, Dominica's debt has been relatively high at around 74 per cent for the same period ( Nevertheless, in the years before Hurricane Erika, the Dominican Government had reinvigorated efforts towards debt consolidation and was undertaking various reforms to meet the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) 13 public debt target of 60 per cent of GDP by 2020 (IMF 2016a).
Prior to Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika, Vanuatu's risk of debt distress was low (IMF 2013b), while Dominica's risk of debt distress was moderate (IMF 2013a). Both countries saw an increase in public debt as a percentage of GDP following the cyclones. As a result, after the cyclone, Vanuatu had a moderate risk of debt distress (IMF 2016b), while Dominica had a high risk of debt distress (IMF 2016a).
Given a country's debt situation, insurance and other forms of risk financing are crucial in reducing sovereign risk to disasters. These can be in the form of either ex-ante (before a disaster) or ex-post (after a disaster) financing instruments. Ex-ante risk-financing instruments require proactive advance planning and include Sources: IMF (2008 IMF ( , 2011 IMF ( , 2013a IMF ( , 2015a IMF ( , 2016a Vanuatu has in place a contingency budget equal to 1.5 per cent of total appropriations (World Bank 2015b), which is around US$2.5 million (IMF 2016b). Although Dominica's 1978 Constitution Chapter 5 (80) (Dominica Government 1978) and Finance (Administration) Act, 1994, Act 4 of 1994 (Part 111)(7) (Dominica Government 1994) , makes provision for a Contingencies Fund, the Dominican Government has not included contingencies in its annual budget provisions.
Ex-post financing practices and arrangements
As with many other governments, both Dominica and Vanuatu have legal provisions to reallocate budgets and also have allowances for supplementary budgets to address a declared state of emergency or a financial emergency (Table 4) . In Vanuatu, transfers within ministries, which are processed within a maximum of three working days, are managed under strict conditions stipulated in the Public Finance and Economic Management (PFEM) Act, Section 34 (A) and (B), requiring both authorisation from the ministers from whose departments funds are being transferred and approval by the Minister for Finance (PCRAFI 2015) . The PFEM Act, Section (C) (1-2) also allows for a supplementary allocation of up to 1. Since the pilot phase, two payouts totalling US$3.2 million to Tonga and Vanuatu (within 10 days of the event)
Sources: CCRIF (2015a, 2017), PCRAFI (2016), World Bank (2015c Bank ( , 2016 . Government (1978 Government ( , 1994 , ***World Bank (2015a), PCRAFI (2015). Notes: a Defined as a natural disaster that has (i) directly affected at least one third of the population and (ii) destroyed more than one quarter of the country's productive capacity or caused damage deemed to exceed 100 per cent of GDP. 
Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika
Given Dominica's and Vanuatu's national contexts, as well as their disaster risk management strategies in place, this section compares the two countries' responses to and efforts to recover from Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika, to assess the relationship between risk management planning and financial capacity, and the quality of emergency response and recovery.
The disasters
Category 5 (Figure 6 ), it produced extraordinarily intense rainfall (Dominica Government 2015e) . Coupled with Dominica's mountainous island topography and the saturated condition of the soil, the heavy rainfall resulted in intense and rapid flooding, with little warning to the population (Dominica Government 2015e). Dominica suffered severe infrastructure damage, primarily related to transportation, housing and agriculture. There were 30 deaths and around 28,594 people were affected.
The estimated damage to both countries was sizeable (Table 2 ). Vanuatu's damage from Cyclone Pam was around US$449 million (64% of GDP) (Vanuatu Government 2015d) , while Hurricane
Erika resulted in damage of around US$483 million (90% of GDP) (Dominica Government 2015e).
Therefore, despite the vastly different categories of cyclones, the impact was still sizeable for both, highlighting the unique vulnerabilities of small island developing states.
Response
Both countries reacted in similar ways to Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika (Tables 6 and 7) . Their national disaster offices/coordinating bodies took the lead in response efforts, with initial assessments carried out to plan relief efforts, and requests made to regional and international partners for support. Whereas Vanuatu declared a state of emergency, Dominica's assessment was that there was no need to declare a state of emergency (Dominica News Online 2015) and instead it declared nine special disaster areas. The regional and international community responded quickly and personnel/support deployed within days, especially through the FRANZ arrangement, 14 a trilateral disaster relief arrangement between Australia, France and New Zealand. Local NGO networks were also active in relief efforts.
Both governments prioritised relief efforts for the most vulnerable communities affected by the disasters (IMF 2016a,b) . The Vanuatu Government also suspended value-added tax (VAT) and import duties on construction materials for two months after the cyclone, deferred payments of vehicle registration fees and VAT to the next quarter, and provided subsidies for agricultural seedlings to affected households (IMF 2016b). The Vanuatu National Provident Fund also allowed its 40,000 active members to withdraw up to 20 per cent of their retirement savings to cover expenses related to Cyclone Pam (IMF 2016b).
Nevertheless, the response efforts in both countries were not without challenges. Common to both were the significant logistics and transportation challenges due to the isolation of numerous communities and challenging geographical terrain (SPC 2016; IFRC 2017) . There were also coordination challenges, particularly data flow and information management coordination from the national disaster offices/coordinating bodies (SPC 2016; IFRC 2017) . In addition, in Vanuatu, coordination of international assistance was initially an issue, as there was a lack of knowledge of the existing national coordination system on the part of some international partners (SPC 2016). In terms of learning from their experiences, both countries conducted workshops to review the lessons learnt from Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika, but only Vanuatu produced a detailed report and recommendations (SPC 2016; IFRC 2017) . Cyclone Pam tested Vanuatu's disaster management structures and, while there were processes that worked well, several areas were highlighted for improvement (SPC 2016) . Some key recommendations from the lessons learnt from Cyclone Pam included improving coordination and information sharing between the different levels of government (national and provincial), communities and agencies (national, regional and international) (SPC 2016) . Some changes to the National Disaster Management Act and standard operating procedures were also recommended (SPC 2016). In addition, there was a need to better track international funding in a more transparent manner (SPC 2016).
Finance
Both countries conducted rapid damage and needs assessment within days of the disasters. Vanuatu also followed up with a Humanitarian Action Plan based on a second phase of harmonised assessment. At the time of issuing the Humanitarian Action Plan, Vanuatu had raised close to US$16 million through its flash appeal, with around US$13.5 million requested through the Humanitarian Action Plan. Overall, Vanuatu raised around US$44 million in humanitarian aid for Cyclone Pam, of which Australia donated US$11 million (ODE 2017) . 15 Vanuatu also drew on its Emergency Disaster Fund (US$23,000), redeployed funds to disaster relief efforts and accessed its general contingency budget allocation, amounting to a total of US$3.6 million (IMF 2016b).
Although there is no information available on the total humanitarian aid flows to Dominica for Hurricane Erika, in its flash appeal Dominica received an Emergency Relief Grant of US$200,000 from the Caribbean Development Bank administered through CDEMA and a US Government emergency grant of US$50,000 through the International Federation of the Red Cross (Dominica Government 2015e) . The EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department also provided €300,000 in emergency humanitarian funding through the Pan American Health Organisation (Dominica Government 2015e) . Information on the private sector insurance payouts for Dominica was not available.
For the mammoth task of rebuilding after the devastating impact of Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu accessed a total of US$98 million in concessional loans from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank and IMF, of which around 17 per cent contained a grant element (Table 8) . Australia also provided around US$26 million to support Vanuatu over three years (2015-18) (Australian Government 2017). Although Dominica is eligible for loans offered by the World Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank (see Table 6 ), Dominica did not access these facilities for reconstruction efforts after Hurricane Erika (CBD 2017; World Bank 2017e). Dominica accessed only US$8.7 million from the IMF's Rapid Credit Facility and Rapid Financing Instrument (IMF 2015b). Dominica's lower borrowing pattern could be a result of its relatively high central government debt to GDP ratios prior to Hurricane Erika (84% in 2014 -see Figure 4 ), which limited further borrowing. Donor grants to finance reconstruction expenditure in Dominica were also below expectations (IMF 2016a). In addition, the IMF (2016a) had emphasised that Dominica should finance its reconstruction activities within fiscally sustainable bounds. Vanuatu, on the other hand, had a significantly lower starting base prior to Cyclone Pam, with central government debt to GDP at 19 per cent in 2014 (see Figure 4) .
Overall, it is estimated that while Vanuatu managed to raise total disaster finance of around US$226 million, covering around 50 per cent of the total damages of Cyclone Pam, crude estimates for Dominica indicate that around US$12 million was secured, covering around 2 per cent of the total damage from Hurricane Erika ( Table 9) . The latter figures, though, are probably significantly underestimated on account of the lack of public information on the financing flows for Hurricane Erika. Nevertheless, Vanuatu's relatively low central government debt levels before the cyclone, coupled with the government's broader access to ex-ante and, especially, ex-post financing instruments (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2) appears to be the catalyst for better meeting the financial impact of Cyclone Pam.
Recovery
By the end of 2016, both countries' economic growth had recovered after falling in 2015 (see Figure 1 ), on the back of the recovery in tourism and agriculture (IMF 2016a,b) . The recovery in Dominica was not as strong as that in Vanuatu, as agricultural activities took longer to recover (IMF 2016a), while Vanuatu's recovery was also boosted by major public infrastructure projects (IMF 2016b). Public debt as a percentage of GDP rose for both countries in 2016, with Vanuatu's public debt increasing from 26 to 34 per cent, while Dominica's public debt rose slightly from 86 to 88 per cent. The increase for Vanuatu was more pronounced than for Dominica, underpinned by the higher borrowing by Vanuatu after Cyclone Pam compared with Dominica (see previous section). Vanuatu's public debt is expected to continue to rise for several years up to an estimated 58 per cent of GDP in 2020, as the Vanuatu Government plans to intensify infrastructure investment (IMF 2016b). As a result, Vanuatu, which previously faced a low risk of debt distress, now faces a moderate risk of debt distress (IMF 2013b (IMF , 2016b .
In Dominica, at the time that Hurricane Erika struck, reforms were under way for public debt consolidation and to meet the ECCU target of 60 per cent by 2020. However, with the impact of Hurricane Erika, and weaker recovery prospects, there was concern that additional public debt consolidation measures before 2021 could be counterproductive, particularly if consolidation crowded out investment for reconstruction (IMF 2016a). Dominica's current debt outlook is also dependent on the extent to which the government is able to secure donor grants for reconstruction, as well as on the performance of its Economic Citizenship Programme (IMF 2016a). Consequently, Dominica faces a high risk of debt distress in contrast to the previously moderate risk (IMF 2013a (IMF , 2016a .
Both countries' recovery prospects have, nevertheless, been derailed by recent natural disaster episodes. Dominica suffered considerably from the impact of Category 5 Hurricane Maria, which was probably even more substantial than Hurricane Erika, while Vanuatu had to undertake a massive relocation exercise of 11,000 people on account of the threat of the volcanic eruption on the island of Ambae. The Vanuatu Government spent a total of US$3.6 million, of which US$230,000 was from the Emergency Disaster Fund and US$2.5 million from budget contingencies, with the remainder from budget reallocation (US$0.9 million).
b Probably underestimated because of lack of public information on these flows.
c Grants of US$16.6 million (see Table 8 ) plus Australia's three-year recovery package of US$26 million.
d See Table 8 for details. e Probably underestimated because of lack of information. n.a., not available. 
Common Challenges and Lessons
This section draws out the common challenges and lessons from the experiences of Dominica and Vanuatu with disaster risk management and financing through the lens of their experiences with Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika.
Shared and unique national characteristics
Dominica and Vanuatu both characterise the common vulnerabilities that small states face, as well as the diversity that is also typical among small states. Both countries have similar physical island characteristics in terms of climate and vegetation, but, whereas Dominica consists of one island, Vanuatu is a group of around 80 islands. As a result of their island geography and locations in the Caribbean and the Pacific, respectively, both countries are highly vulnerable to multiple hazards, such as cyclones, earthquakes, flooding, volcanic activity and associated tsunami threats. They both have a long history of sustaining considerable losses from the impact of disasters, although Vanuatu has a higher risk of humanitarian crises and disasters than Dominica, based on the Index for Risk Management. Nevertheless, both countries are considered to have a high resilience to external shocks and are categorised as 'high vulnerable and high resilience' countries according to Briguglio's (2014) revised vulnerability/resilience framework.
There is also commonality and diversity in other aspects. Vanuatu's population is four times as many as Dominica's, with many ni-Vanuatu living in rural areas, while the majority of Dominicans live in urban areas. However, they are similar in that both countries have a young population, with women, children and youth among their most vulnerable inhabitants, particularly to the impact of disasters.
Their economies are also relatively similar in that they are both based on a narrow range of sectors, particularly tourism and agriculture. However, Vanuatu is endowed with more natural resources than Dominica, and its agricultural-based products and exports have helped it fare much better after the impact of the global financial crises.
As measured by standard income and development metrics, Dominica, an upper middle-income country, outperforms Vanuatu, a least developed country, in terms of income per capita and ranking on the Human Development Index. However, Vanuatu has much lower poverty and unemployment rates, as well as a strong traditional social safety net system, and has consistently ranked high in the Happy Planet Index Score.
In terms of governance, there are also similarities and differences. Both countries gained independence from the United Kingdom around the same time and they also have similar systems of government based on a unicameral parliament. Both governments are guided by national development plans, with similar priorities around socio-economic measures and the environment. Their local government arrangements reflect the urban concentration (Dominica) and rural spread (Vanuatu) of their populations. In addition, for Vanuatu, the state's reach is weak outside the urban centres and power is vested in churches and the traditional chiefly system. Corruption in government has also been more an issue for Vanuatu than for Dominica.
These national characteristics are important to bear in mind when considering the challenges and lessons learnt from the experiences of Vanuatu and Dominica with Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika, respectively. Although Category 5 Cyclone Pam was much more severe than Hurricane Erika, the impacts on Vanuatu and Dominica were similar in terms of damages and loss of life, which is a good basis for comparison.
Deconstructing the experiences of Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika
Normative disaster risk management frameworks and the public financial management of disasters are key to deconstructing the experiences of Vanuatu and Dominica in their response to and recovery from Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika, respectively. These elements constitute crucial preconditions for withstanding natural disasters.
Despite both countries historically experiencing frequent and severe episodes of natural disasters, it appears that Vanuatu has made more effort to ensure that disaster risk reduction, not just disaster management, is firmly entrenched in its normative frameworks, including through its national development plan, legislation, policy frameworks and institutional architecture. Although the effective implementation of these frameworks is essential as well, the mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction and management is a strong signal of political will and priority, which are critical for public service delivery.
Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika tested both governments' disaster response systems. Both countries reacted in similar ways by triggering their disaster offices/coordinating bodies. They also had similar challenges, particularly around logistics and transportation, as well as coordination of efforts on the ground. However, in terms of learning from their experiences, while both countries conducted workshops to review the lessons learnt, only Vanuatu produced a detailed report with practical recommendations for the government to pursue. This is further evidence of Vanuatu's strong commitment to disaster risk reduction and management compared with Dominica. Hence, political direction and support is vital to ensuring a culture of building resilience.
For countries that frequently experience natural disasters, the financial challenge of rebuilding and reconstruction is often met with external borrowing and, as the country is continuously battered by disasters, debt servicing issues can become a problem if debt spirals out of control. This could then limit further borrowing in the event of future disasters. Therefore, a country's debt position is an important element in considering its ability to respond and recover from natural disasters. Additionally, ex-ante and ex-post disaster financing practices and arrangements are critical in reducing sovereign risk to disasters.
In both areas, Vanuatu had a better pre-disaster position than Dominica, as it had a significantly lower public debt to GDP ratio (26%, compared with Dominica's 86%), and had at its disposal a wider range of disaster financing instruments. These better pre-existing conditions meant that Vanuatu was better able to raise finance to meet the total costs of Cyclone Pam. On the other hand, Dominica's pre-existing conditions limited its options and fell far short of meeting the total costs of Hurricane Erika, even though those costs have probably been underestimated.
Moreover, to Vanuatu's advantage, bilateral and multilateral donors were more responsive to its relief and reconstruction efforts than those of Dominica, where the government found it more difficult to secure donor grant funding. This is despite both countries being eligible for overseas development assistance (ODA), 16 as well as having similar eligibility criteria for grants from IFIs (see Table 5 ). From a bilateral perspective, one of the reasons could be that Vanuatu has a much closer political relationship with its major bilateral donor, Australia, than the relationship between Dominica and Japan, its major bilateral donor. For multilateral IFIs, concerns over Dominica's debt situation could have hindered their response. These contrasting experiences reinforce the importance of ex-ante financing arrangements away from the reliance on unpredictable ex-post donor finance.
Nevertheless, both countries' economies have since rebounded from the impact of the disasters, with Vanuatu's recovery much stronger on the back of major public infrastructure projects financed by external loans. Vanuatu, however, now faces a moderate risk of debt distress (previously, this was low) from the increase in external borrowing after Cyclone Pam. Although Dominica's borrowing after Hurricane Erika was limited, this still pushed its risk of debt distress from moderate to high, including as a result of its already high public debt to GDP ratio.
However, by September 2017, both countries had to respond to yet another spate of disastersDominica to the destruction of Category 5 Hurricane Maria, while Vanuatu had to relocate 11,000 people as the result of the threat of a volcanic eruption on the island of Ambae. These recent events serve to emphasise the importance of having appropriate and effective disaster risk reduction and management practices in place.
Lessons for small states
There are three key lessons that can be drawn from the experiences of Vanuatu and Dominica with disaster risk reduction and management, especially around their response to and recovery from Cyclone Pam and Hurricane Erika, respectively. iii Ex-ante financing arrangements are vital: Given the unpredictability of ex-post financing, ensuring that ex-ante financing arrangements are in place will be crucial for reconstruction and rebuilding after natural disasters.
None of these lessons will come as a surprise to policy-makers and practitioners, but the experiences of Vanuatu and Dominica serve to underline these key fundamentals. These fundamentals are often widely acknowledged but more often than not are not put into practice. There are many reasons that might prevent the implementation in practice, but the overarching cause is most probably a lack of political will, which is essentially an issue of governance at all levels, not just of national governance but also of regional and international governance.
It is well recognised that small states, as a result of their unique vulnerabilities, have limited capacity to deal with not just the impact of climate change and the increased severity and frequency of natural disasters, but also other social, economic and environmental challenges that face them. This means that regional and international support are critical in supporting small states.
With the rising number and scale of climate-related disasters, small states face growing challenges in disaster risk reduction and management.
Hurricanes Irma and Maria devastated many of the Caribbean small states in September 2017. In response, led by a push from the UK, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in October 2017, agreed to work on a process that could allow previous aid recipients (high-income countries) to receive short-term ODA support in the event of catastrophic crises, such as the recent hurricanes in the Caribbean (UK Government 2017). While this is no doubt a welcome and significant change in the global aid architecture, which will hopefully lead to better response from the donor community to the challenges of small states, there is still much more to be done to meet the existential challenge that small states face. This milestone 20th volume looks back at the progress of small states over the past 25 years. It also takes stock of the Commonwealth Secretariat's contribution to the international discourse on small states and the development of the states themselves.
A Sustainable Future for Small States: Pacific 2050
Sustainable Future for Small States: Pacific 2050 is part of the Commonwealth Secretariat's regional strategic foresight programme that examines whether current development strategies set a region on a path to achieve sustainable development by 2050.
The study analyses whether Commonwealth Pacific small states (Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) will achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. It reviews critical areas that can serve as a catalyst for change in the region: governance (examining political governance, development effectiveness and co-ordination, and ocean governance); noncommunicable diseases; information and communications technology and climate change (focussing on migration and climate change, and energy issues).
In each of these areas, possible trajectories to 2050 are explored, gaps in the current policy responses are identified, and recommendations are offered to steer the region towards the Pacific Vision of 'a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity, so that all Pacific people can lead free, healthy, and productive lives'. 
